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Ross: Real Property--Wills--Judicial Construction of to A and His Child

Real Property -

Wills

-

udicial Construction of

"to A and His Children"
One of the incidents of property ownership is the determination
by the owner of the objects to whom his property will be distributed
after his death. The owner expresses his desires by a will. In the law
of wills, precise language is of the utmost importance. Once the will
takes effect, its language and the circumstances surrounding its making are the only means of determining the intentions of the testator.
Such language, when clear and unambiguous and not in violation of
any positive rule of law, controls the interpretation of the will.' When
the language used is ambiguous and susceptible of different interpretations, however, courts have adopted rules of construction that
determine the interpretation in the absence of evidence indicating a
contrary intention of the testator. By the use of these rules of construction, the courts attempt to give effect to the probable intention
of the testator. The designation of beneficiaries by the phrase "A and
his children" has been the source of much litigation and has resulted
in the application of several different rules of construction to ascertain
the testator's intent.
A devise "to A and his children" has three possible interpretations. 2 In the first of these, A takes a fee simple absolute to the exclusion of his children3 under the theory that the word "children,"
normally a word of purchase, is used as a word of limitation. 4 In the
second interpretation, A and his children take as tenants in common.'
In the third, A takes a life estate with the remainder to his children. 6
The origin of the first two interpretations is the Rule in Wild's Case.7
I Young v. Lewis, 138 W. Va. 425, 76 S.E.2d 276 (1953); McCreery v.
Johnston, 90 W. Va. 80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922); Cresap v. Cresap, 34 W. Va.
310, 12 S.E. 527 (1890).
2 4A G. THOMPSON, COMln~fNvTunRs ON -M MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2008 (1961); Talley v. Ferguson, 64 W. Va. 328, 62 S.E. 456 (1908);

Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va. 381, 44 S.E. 198 (1903). For an extensive discussion of the nature of an estate created by grant or gift to one and his
children see Annot., 161 A.L.R. 612 (1946).
3 L. Simms & A. SMrrH, TE LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS § 696 (2d ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as Smnms & SzurH]; Larew v. Larew, 146 Va. 134, 135
S.E. 819 (1926).
4 Hutchens v. Denton, 83 W. Va. 580, 98 S.E. 808 (1919); Wills v. Foltz,
61 W.
5 Va. 262, 56 S.E. 473 (1907).
Wills v. Foltz, 61 W. Va. 262, 56 S.E. 473 (1907); Bently v. Ash, 59
W. Va. 641, 53 S.E. 636 (1906); 36 VA. L. Rnv. 985 (1950).
6 Smith v. Smith, 119 Ky. 899, 85 S.W. 169 (1905); McCullough's Estate,
272 Pa. 509, 116 A. 477 (1922); Talley v. Ferguson, 64 W. Va. 328, 62 S.E.
456 (1908); see also 36 MARQ. L. Rlv. 191 (1952).
777 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1599).
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The rule is famous for its two resolutions, which have been accepted
in the United States.8 The first resolution holds that if a person devises
his lands to A and his children, and A has no children at the time of
the devise, an estate in fee tail is created. The devise "to A and his
children," when A has no children, clearly indicates the testator's
intention to benefit the children of A if any should be born. If A dies
seized of this estate, it will be inherited by one or more of these afterborn children. 9 Today, instead of taking a fee tail when the first resolution is applied, A receives either a fee simple or a life estate under
modern statutes favoring such estates.' 0
There is little justification for the rule of construction set forth in
the first resolution of the Rule in Wild's Case. The popularity of fee
tail estates has disappeared, and it is doubtful that a testator would
intentionally create such an estate." Furthermore, since estates in fee
simple may now be created without the use of words of limitation
(and his heirs) essential under old English law,' 2 it is probable that
the testator used the word "children" as a word of purchase. This3
would give the children of A an interest in the devised property.'
However, additional factors in the will may indicate that the word
"children" is used as a word of limitation, and thus the parent under
modern statutes would take a fee simple.' 4 The children, if any are
subsequently born, could then take by descent or by devise from their
parent. Still, this construction presents the possibility that the intention
of the testator to benefit A's children might be defeated; the parent,

8 Snms, & Smi, supra note 3, at §§ 696-98; Casner, Construction of
Gifts "To A and His Children" (Herein the Rule in Wild's Case), 7 U. Cm.
L. RPv. 438, 454 (1940).
9 RESTATEmENT Or PROPERTY § 283, comment a at 1484 (1940); Snvms
& SMrrE, supra note 3, at § 692.
'0For a collection of the statutes on estates in fee tail see RESTATEMENT

OF PROPERTY ch. 5, Introductory Note, Special Notes 1-6 (1936). In West
Virginia, every estate that would have been an estate in tail in 1776 in Virginia is deemed an estate in fee simple. W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1, § 12
(Michie 1966).
1 Casner, supra note 8, at 447.
125

AMEPJCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.18 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). For

a collection of the statutes that eliminate the necessity of words of limitation

see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 39, Special Note (1936). Words of limita-

tion are no longer necessary in West Virginia. W. VA. CODE ch. 36, art. 1,
§ 11 (Michie 1966).
13See Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va. 381, 387, 44 S.E. 198, 201 (1903).
Ordinarily, the words child or children are words of purchase, vesting
a new estate in those persons, and not words of limitation, ineffectual
to vest an estate, but effectual to mark out the limits of the ancestor's
estate, showing it to be an estate of inheritance and prescribing the
course of descent.
14See note 10, supra; Casner, supra note 8, at 446.
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as owner of a fee simple absolute, could convey or devise the property
to some third person to the exclusion of his children.
Two other constructions of the situation in which the first resolution applies assure the children of A, if born, of sharing in the property. The gift "to A and his children" may be construed to give to A
an estate in fee simple subject to partial divestiture when children are
born; at that time the children receive a concurrent interest in fee
simple. The construction most likely to give effect to the true intention of the testator - since most people think of parent and children
enjoying property successively, rather than concurrently - is that A
takes a life estate with remainder to his children."
In West Virginia, although it appears that the first resolution in
Wild's Case is settled law, the existence of other factors in the will
indicating a contrary intention of the testator are given effect.' 6 At
least two states

-

Kentucky and Pennsylvania -

have repudiated the

first resolution and adopted the construction that gives a life estate to
the parent with a remainder to his children. 17 In these states, as in
West Virginia, the application of the first resolution in Wild's Case
would have resulted in the creation of a fee simple estate because of
statutes favoring such an estate. 18 The life estate-remainder view was
developed in Kentucky to insure that the property would ultimately
pass to blood relatives of the testator. This construction eventually was
adopted for all devises "to A and his children."' 9
IsCasner, supra note 8, at 448. The Restatement of the Law of Property
has repudiated the first resolution in Wild's Case and adopted the life estate
and remainder construction. RESTATEMENT OF PROPRTY § 283(b) (1940).
The Ui
nRmo PRoPERTY AcT § 13 (1938) also adopts this construction.
'6 Martin v. Martin, 52 W. Va. 381, 44 S.E. 198 (1903). After the gift
"to A and her children" the will provided that if A "died without children,"
the gift would go to another. The court held that such a provision was inconsistent with the idea of a fee tail estate. In denying a partition to the children of A, the court rejected the construction of a tenancy in common between
parent and children and intimated that the parent might take a fee simple. A
concurring judge believed that the parent took a life estate with remainder
to his children. In Clemens v. Morris, 24 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. W. Va. 1938),

a deed conveying land to a woman and her children vested no interest in her
children
7 born after the date of the deed.

1 Righter v. Forrester, 64 Ky. 278 (1866); Carr v. Estill, 55 Ky. 309

(1855). In Hicks v. Jewett, 202 Ky. 61, 258 S.W. 934 (1924) and Ramey
v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922), a life estate and remainder
construction was adopted in a conveyance "to A and his children forever."
In Chambers v. Union Trust Co., 235 Pa. 610, 84 A. 512 (1912), the first
resolution in Wild's Case was held to be inapplicable and a devise "to A and
his children" was held to create a life estate in the parent with a remainder
to his children.
18See note 10, supra.
19Hicks v. Jewett, 202 Ky. 61, 258 S.W. 934 (1924); Ramey v. Ramey,
195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922).
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According to the second resolution of the Rule in Wild's Case,
if a man devises his lands "to A and his children' and A has children
at the time of the devise, A and his children will take equal and concurrent estates. This resolution has been widely recognized in the
United States and has been followed in West Virginia.20 At the time
of Wild's Case, the second resolution created a joint tenancy. Today,
many jurisdictions, including West Virginia, statutorily create a presumption in favor of a tenancy in common unless a contrary intention
is clearly expressed. 2'
The second resolution, like the first, is only a rule of construction
that is applied in the absence of additional factors indicating a con23
trary intention of the testator. 2 For example, in Talley v. Ferguson,
a grant was made to a man "for the sole use and benefit of the wife
and children" of another; the grant was declared to be a provision for
the family. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals declared
that such a conveyance would create, in the wife and the children in
being, a joint estate in equal portions.24 The court, however, held that
in view of the indications that the grant was a provision for the family,
the more reasonable construction was a life estate in the wife with
remainder to the children. This construction would allow any afterborn children to share in the gift and would provide the life tenant
with sufficient income to support her children.
The result will be different in cases in which there is no indica20

Dryer v. Crawford, 90 Ala. 131, 7 So. 445 (1889); Kelly v. Kelly,
176 Ark. 548, 3 S.W.2d 305 (1928); In re Utz's Estate, 43 Cal. 200 (1872);
Moore v. Ennis, 10 Del. Ch. 170, 87 A. 1009 (1913); Whitfield v. Means,
140 Ga. 430, 78 S.E. 1067 (1913); Albers v. Donovan, 371 III. 458, 21 N.E.2d
563 (1939); Biggs v. McCarty, 86 Ind. 352, 44 Am. R. 320 (1882); Schlemeyer v. Mellencamp, 159 Kan. 544, 156 P.2d 879 (1945); Reddoch v. Williams, 129 Miss. 706, 92 So. 831 (1922); Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670 (1877);
Kyte v. Kyte, 73 NJ. Eq. 220, 67 A. 933 (Ct. Ch. NJ. 1907); In re Parant's
Will, 39 Misc. 2d 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sur. Ct. 1963); Buckner v. Maynard,
198 N.C. 802, 153 SE. 458 (1930); Snowden v. Snowden, 187 N.C. 539, 122
S.E. 300 (1924); Clark v. Clark, 13 Ohio App. 164 (1920); Coogler v. Crosby,
89 S.C. 508, 72 S.E. 149 (1911); Smith v. Smith, 108 Tenn. 21, 64 S.W. 483
(1901); Rose v. Rose, 191 Va. 171, 60 S.E.2d 45 (1950); Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 100 Va. 552, 42 SE. 306 (1902); Wills v. Foltz, 61 W. Va. 262, 56
S.E. 473 (1907); Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 53 S.E. 636 (1906).
21 Snins &SMrrn, supra note 3,at §§ 698-99; 5 AMmICAN LAW OF PROPnaT § 22.22 (A. J.Casner ed. 1952); W. VA. CoDE ch. 36, art. 1, §§ 19-20
(Michie
1966).
22
Casner, supra note 8, at 456.
23 64 W. Va. 328, 62 SE. 456 (1908).
24
See Wills v. Foltz, 61 W. Va. 262, 270, 56 SE. 473, 476 (1907). A
devise to three named daughters "and their children," there being children
alive at the testator's death, confers a joint estate in equal portions upon the
daughters and their children; it does not vest a fee simple in the daughters
alone. The court held that "[t]he weight of authority sustains Wild's Case."
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tion of a contrary intent and the second resolution is fully applicable.
If the devise "to A and his children" takes effect at the death of the
testator, any after-born children of A are excluded. The class of
beneficiaries closes when the gift takes effect - the death of the
testator being the point of distribution. For example, if A has one
child at the date the devise becomes effective and subsequently has
five other children, A and his first child will each take an undivided
one-half interest in the property as tenants in common; the other five
children will take nothing.2 On the other hand, if the gift is postponed, as in "to B for life, remainder to A and his children," the gift
is not limited to the children alive at the date of the devise but also
includes any children born before the termination of the postponed
period - the end of the preceding life estate. Any children born to A
after the termination of the preceding life estate, however, are excluded
from sharing in the gift; the class of beneficiaries closes at the point
26
of distribution - the death of the intervening life tenant.
In Tharp v. Tharp2 7 a life estate preceded the gift "to A and his
children." The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
interest created by the gift vested in the parent and his only child at
the death of the testator. The child's interest was subject to divestment
pro tanto upon the birth of other children prior to the expiration of
the preceding life estate. The court departed from its decision in Wills
v. Foltz28 in which the parent and children took equal shares as tenants
in common. In Tharp, the parent received a one-half share, and the
other half was to be divided between all his children alive at the
testator's death or born before the termination of the anterior life
estate.
The exclusion of after-born children when the probable intention
25

Bently v. Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 53 SM. 636 (1906). The testator devised
land to his seven children, share and share alike. He further provided that
the share of one daughter, who had one child at the date of the will and at
the testator's death, was to be given "to her and her child or children." The
court decided that by the use of the additional words "or children" when
there was only one child living, the testator intended for after-born children
to share in the gift. Not only the child living at the time of the testator's death,
but all children born to the daughter thereafter took in fee equally with their
mother.
26
Casner, supra note 8, at 458; 36 MARQ. L. Rnv. 191, 192-93 (1952).
27 131 W. Va. 529, 48 S.E.2d 793 (1948). The only child of Earl M.
Tharp survived the testator but predeceased the life tenant. The deceased child's
mother brought suit claiming that she and her husband took their child's share
of the vested remainder as his sole heirs-at-law. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a one-fourth undivided interest in the testator's estate, subject to divestment pro tanto in favor of other children born to her before the
termination of the preceding life estate.
28 61 W. Va. 262, 56 S.E. 473 (1907).
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of the testator was that they share in the gift is the reason advanced
for the repudiation of the second resolution in Kentucky and Penn29
sylvania and the adoption of the life estate-remainder construction.

The reasons for adherence to the second resolution are that such a
construction is in conformity with the plain import of the words "to A
and his children"; that if the testator had intended a life estate and
remainder, he could have expressed that intention; and that public
policy, favoring the free alienation of land, is against the life estate
and remainder construction. 0 The rationale behind the first reason is
questionable. If at the time the gift became effective A was a young
man and had only one child, the application of the second resolution
would not be in conformity with the plain import of the words "to A
and his children." Second, it has been argued that if the testator had
intended to benefit only the children living at his death, he could have
designated them by name as easily as he could have designated a life
estate and remainder.3 ' This argument ignores the fact that wills are
drafted many years before the testator's death, in most cases without
knowledge of how many children there may be at his death. The third
reason - public policy - is a valid one. However, rules of construction are designed to give effect to the testator's probable intention if
to do so would not violate any rule of law. The purpose of these
rules would be defeated if the courts disregarded the testator's legally
acceptable and probable intention in favor of a construction said to
be more agreeable to public policy.
Although the Rule in Wild's Case has been adopted in West
Virginia, judicial approval of its resolutions has been less than wholehearted. In order to include after-born children, the court, in Talley
v. Ferguson,2 indicated a willingness to follow any manifest indications that supported a reasonable construction of a life estate in the
wife with remainder to the children. In Wills v. Foltz,33 Judge Brannon
declared that, although legally compelled to give effect to the second
resolution, he believed that the testator never intended to give his
grandchildren concurrent interests with his daughters. Rather, the
29
Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922); Virginia Iron,
Coal & Coke Co. v. Dye, 146 Ky. 519, 142 S.W. 1057 (1912); Elliot v.
Diamond Coal &Coke Co., 230 Pa. 423, 79 A. 708 (1911); Hague v. Hague,

161 Pa. 643, 29 A. 261 (1894). The UNwonm PRoPiRTY ACr § 13 (1938),

adopts the life estate and remainder construction. The RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 283(a) (1940), advances the second resolution in Wild's Case.
30 36 MARQ. L REv. 191, 194 (1952); 36 VA. L. REv. 985, 986 (1950).
31 United States v. 654.8 Acres of Land, 102 F. Supp. 937, 941 (E.D.
Tenn. 1952).
32 64 W. Va. 328, 62 S.E. 456 (1908).
33 61 W. Va. 262, 270, 56 SE. 473, 476 (1907).
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testator believed that he was giving his daughters either a fee simple
or a life estate.
The fee tail estate created by the application of the first resolution is now an anachronism. The tenancy in common resulting from
the application of the second resolution has been reluctantly accepted
in many cases. For these reasons and for the purpose of achieving
consistency in the interpretation of the phrase "to A and his children,"
both resolutions of the Rule in Wild's Case should be repudiated by
the courts of West Virginia and a life estate-remainder construction
adopted. There is no justification under modem property law for
adherence to a construction creating a presumption that the testator
intended to create a fee tail estate. Most states have statutorily converted what would have been a fee tail at common law into a fee
simple or a life estate to the parent and remainder to the heirs of his
body. It is therefore highly unlikely that such an estate would be
purposely created today.34 Adherence to the construction creating a
concurrent estate in "A and his children" living at the time of the
devise results in the exclusion of any children later born to A, unless
the testator expressly indicates that they be included." The life estateremainder construction is more likely to give effect to the normal
intention of the testator since a parent and his children are usually
thought to enjoy property successively, rather than concurrently. Furthermore, a testator probably intends to benefit all of A's children
whenever born.
Although the life estate-remainder construction may successfully
effectuate the testators intent, the necessity for its use should never
arise if the will creating the gift is properly drafted. To ensure that the
wishes of the testator are fulfilled, the words "A and his children"
should never be used to designate the beneficiaries of any disposition
of property. Usually, when the testator wishes to make a gift to "A
and his children," he has in mind one of the constructions discussed
earlier. His real intention can be ascertained from a thorough questioning by his attorney.
The testator may wish to give the property to the parent absolutely, his reference to the children indicating that they should benefit,
if at all, by inheritance. When this is the case, the parent should be
expressly given a fee simple absolute. Second, the testator may desire
for "A and his children" to share the gift equally as concurrent
34

See note 10, supra; Casner, supra note 8, at 447-48.

3559

W. Va. 641, 53 S.E. 636 (1906); note 25, supra.
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owners. To effectuate this desire, it should be clearly stated that "A
and his children" are to share as tenants in common. If after-born
children are to be included, a provision to that effect should be made.
Finally, the testator may intend for "A and his children" to enjoy the
property as successive owners. To achieve this result, the language
used should limit the interest of the parent to a life estate and state
that the children are to take the entire interest in remainder. Another
clause should specify how the property is to be distributed in the
event of the death of a child prior to the termination of the life
estate.3 6 By specifically setting out the nature of the gift, the means
of distribution, and a provision for contingencies, the attorney can
be assured of having clearly expressed the intention of his client. The
testators intention will not be defeated by the use of a rule of construction because the attorney has prevented the need for its application.
Thomas R. Ross II
36
Casner, supra note 8, at 468-69.
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